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WHAT CRITIQUES OF SARBANES-OXLEY
CAN TEACH ABOUT REGULATION OF
NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE
Ellen P. Aprill*
After a series of well-publicized corporate scandals, most notably Enron
and WorldCom, President George W. Bush signed the American
Competitiveness and Corporate Accountability Act of 2002, commonly
known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), into law on July 30, 2002.1 It has
been called "the most sweeping federal securities legislation since the
original laws in 1933 and 1934."2 Among SOX's provisions are increased
disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
establishment of a new oversight board for public accounting firms,
limitation of non-audit services that can be provided by a firm's auditors,
required disclosure of internal controls, a prohibition on loans to insiders, a
mandate that the audit committee consist solely of independent members,
3
and certification by executives of financial reports.
4
With the exception of the provisions related to document retention,
5
Congress applied SOX only to publicly traded American companies.
Nonetheless, invocation of SOX quickly reverberated across the nonprofit
landscape. One after another, nonprofit advisors and trade groups urged
voluntary compliance with the principles of SOX. 6 Three examples give a
sense of the broad and enthusiastic response. Independent Sector and
BoardSource, in their 2003 pamphlet The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
Implicationsfor Nonprofit Organizations, called SOX "a wake-up call to
the entire nonprofit community" and directed nonprofit leaders to "look
carefully at the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley" to "determine whether their
organizations ought to voluntarily adopt governance best practices, even if

* John E. Anderson Professor of Tax Law and Associate Dean for Academic Programs,
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
1. Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.).

2. Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Sarbanes-Oxley Debacle: What We've
Learned; How to Fix It 1 (2006).
3. See SOX §§ 101-705 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 29 U.S.C.).
4. See id. § 802, 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Supp. IV 2004).
5. See id. § 106, 15 U.S.C. § 7216 (Supp. IV 2004).
6. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure
Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 205, 244-45 (2004);

Wendy K. Szymanski, An Allegory of Good (andBad) Governance: Applying the SarbanesOxley Act to Nonprofit Organizations,2003 Utah L. Rev. 1303, 1305.
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not mandated by law."'7
The National Association of College and
University Business Officers issued an Advisory Report in November 2003
(NACUBO Advisory) recommending that institutions of higher education
look to SOX as a framework. 8 The Coordinating Committee on Nonprofit
Governance of the American Bar Association (ABA) published the Guide
to Nonprofit Corporate Governance in the Wake of Sarbanes-Oxley, which
the ABA sells on its web page. 9
Given the very different nature of the public companies and nonprofit
corporations, this reaction is quite remarkable. According to the Final
Report of the SEC Advisory Committee on Smaller Companies,' 0 there are
fewer than 9500 public companies subject to SOX. l" The report classified
smaller public companies as those with equity capitalizations of $787
million or less. 12 In contrast, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reports
that for 2003 it received information returns from 211,858 charitable
nonprofit organizations, and only 63,327, or 27%, of these organizations
had assets over $1 million. 13 The total number does not include the
smallest of exempt organizations-those with annual gross receipts less
14
than $25,000, since they are not required to file an information return.
Thus, the public companies subject to SOX are a small number of entities,
all of which have substantial resources. The Exempt Organization Division
of the IRS regulates an enormous number of entities with relatively few
assets. 15

7. BoardSource & Indep. Sector, The Sarbanes Oxley Act and Implications for Nonprofit
Organizations 2 (2006), http://www.boardsource.org/dl.asp?documentid=524.
8. Nat'l Ass'n of Coll. and Univ. Bus. Officers, Advisory Report 2003-3 (2003) [hereinafter
NACUBO Advisory Report], availableat http://www.nacubo.org/Documents/news/2003-03.pdf.

9. See ABA Web Store, Guide to Nonprofit Corporate Governance in the Wake of
Sarbanes-Oxley,
http://www.abanet.org/abastore/index.cfm?section=main&fmProduct.AddToCart&pid=507
0509 (last visited Oct. 12, 2007).
10. SEC Advisory Comm. on Smaller Pub. Cos., Final Report of the Advisory
Committee on Smaller Public Companies to the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (2006) [hereinafter SEC Advisory Committee Final Report], available at
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-finalreport.pdf.
11. Id. at 7 n. 13 tbl.2. Other sources report a somewhat larger number of public
companies. In response to an e-mail inquiry, Bonnie C. Dailey, Senior Counsel for the
SEC's Office of Investor Education and Assistance, gave the total number of issuers filing
annual reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the fiscal year ending
September 30, 2006, as approximately 13,575, including issuers of mortgage obligations and

similar securities but excluding mutual funds, investment companies, and other 1940 Act
regulated entities. E-mail from Bonnie C. Dailey, Senior Counsel for SEC's Office of
Investor Education and Assistance (May 24, 2007, 15:21:01 EST) (on file with author).
12. SEC Advisory Committee Final Report, supra note 10, at I n. 1.
13. See I.R.S. Form 990, Returns of Nonprofit Charitable Section 501(c)(3)
Organizations: Selected Balance Sheet and Income Statement Items, by Asset Size, Tax
Year 2003, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/03eo0las.xls. Guidestar posts information on all
tax-exempt organizations, including but not limited to section 501 (c)(3) charities.
14. See id.; I.R.S. Announcement 94-117, 1994-39 I.R.B. 19.
15. See Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Governing Nonprofit Organizations: Federal and
State Law and Regulation 460 (2004).
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Nonetheless, many predicted state law versions of SOX for nonprofits.16
In January 2003, then-New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer released a
draft bill to apply certain provisions of SOX to New York charities. I7 After

objections from the charitable sector to both the original draft and a revision
of it, Spitzer announced in September 2003 that further study was needed

before enactment.' 8

The Massachusetts Attorney General also released

draft legislation that was never enacted. 19 In 2004, California passed the
audit committees for its
Nonprofit Integrity Act, requiring audits of and
20

charities with gross revenues above $2 million.

Congress also trumpeted the call for improved nonprofit governance.
The Senate Finance Committee expressed its interest in corporate

governance matters through a White Paper released in connection with a
June 2004 hearing and subsequent inquiries into the corporate governance
21
of such prominent nonprofits as the Red Cross and American University.

At the request of the Senate Finance Committee, Independent Sector
convened the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector in the fall of 2004 to make

recommendations for reform. 22

The panel issued an interim report in

March 2005, a final report in June 2005, and a supplemental report in April
2006.23 The Pension Protection Act of 2006, signed into law on August 17,
2006, included a number of charitable reforms but did not address matters
24
of corporate governance.

16. See generally Dana Brakman Reiser, There Ought to Be a Law: The Disclosure
Focus of Recent Legislative Proposalsfor NonprofitReform, 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 559, 56466 (2005).
17. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 15, at 110.
18. See id.
19. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 16, at 563.
20. Nonprofit Integrity Act, 2004 Cal. Stat. ch. 919 (as signed by governor Sept. 29,
2004) (codified in Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12581-12599 (West 2004)).
21. See Grassley Writes American University on Governance Issues, Tax Notes Today,
May 17, 2006, available at LEXIS, 2006 TNT 97-21; Grassley Urges Red Cross to Address
Governance, Volunteers' Concerns, Tax Notes Today, Feb. 27, 2006, available at LEXIS,
2006, TNT 39-19; Senate Finance Issues DiscussionDraft on Reforms for EOs, Tax Notes
Today, June 21, 2004, availableat LEXIS, 2004 TNT 120-18.
22. Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, About the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector,
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/about/Index.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).
23. Id. The panel itself consisted of twenty-four distinguished leaders from around the
country. It established two expert advisory groups (the citizens advisory group and the
expert advisory group) and five work groups (governance and fiduciary responsibility; legal
framework; government oversight and self-regulation; small organizations; transparency and
financial accountability). Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Participants in the Panel,
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/participants/Index.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2007). The
Ninety organizations made financial
panel held hearings across the country. Id.
commitments. According to the panel's web page, as of October 4, 2006, more than 500
groups and individuals had signed onto the final report. See Panel on the Nonprofit Sector,
Final
Report,
Panel's
to
the
Signed
on
Have
Who
List
of Those
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/signers (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).
24. See generally Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780
(codified in scattered sections of the I.R.C. and 29 U.S.C.). At the most general level,
corporate governance involves how board members comply with their fiduciary duties of
loyalty and of care. For nonprofit boards, a third duty, the duty of obedience to the
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While nonprofits have been voluntarily adopting provisions like those in
SOX and states have been proposing and, in one case, imposing them, SOX
itself has been the subject of withering criticism, not only by those being
regulated but also by many academics. Several prominent legal scholars
recently have published fierce critiques of it. 25 Some of their criticisms
accept the purpose of SOX, but question the efficacy of particular
provisions, that is, whether the new laws in fact address the problems at
which they aim. 26 In a similar vein, another set of the criticisms argues
that, however lofty the goal of a particular provision, its burdens outweigh
its benefits. 2 7 Much of the criticism, however, is far more fundamentalthat SOX's governance provisions represent a misplaced and unwarranted
federalization, upsetting the proper balance between state and federal
regulation by intruding into matters of corporate governance that have been
28
and should remain the province of the states.
SOX questions the proper allocation and coordination of power between
a federal agency, the SEC, and state law regarding for-profit corporate
governance. It also questions the allocation and coordination of power
between the IRS and state law for nonprofit governance. In neither the forprofit nor the nonprofit context has the mission of the federal agency
historically been directed primarily at corporate governance. The SEC
regulates public corporations in order to protect investors and the public
markets. Historically, it has relied on disclosure requirements rather than
substantive regulation. SOX enlarged its role in regulating corporate
governance. The IRS regulates nonprofit corporations for compliance with
the conditions for the laws regarding tax exemption in order to protect the
federal fisc. Statutory and regulatory developments, beginning with the
enactment of the private foundation rules and moving through enactment of
the intermediate sanctions to recent changes to Form 1023 and proposed
changes to Form 990 have enlarged the IRS's role in regulating corporate
governance. 29 Both of these federal agencies must confront the issue of
how far their mandates require or allow them to determine matters of
corporate governance. The relationship of each of these federal agencies to
state corporate law makes recent extensive critiques of SOX useful for
examining similar issues, both specific and more general, that arise in
regulation of nonprofits.

organization's mission and purpose, is added. See generally Fremont-Smith, supra note 15,

at 187-237.
25. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 2; Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L.J. 1521 (2005); see also Robert
Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A
Morality Talefor Policymakers Too, 22 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 251 (2005).
26. See infra Part I.
27. See infra Part I.
28. See infra Part I.
29. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 15, at 395-408; Norman I. Silber, Nonprofit
Interjurisdictionality,80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 613, 624-27 (2005).
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A caveat as we begin. The critics of SOX whose work is discussed in
this essay reject the very premises regarding the nature of the relationship
30
between government and the public corporation upon which SOX rests.
To these scholars, the critique of SOX is, at bottom, a rejection of federal
regulation in favor of free market competition. 3 1 My purpose here is not to
criticize these critiques when it comes to the public corporation. For
purposes of this essay, I accept the critics' premises regarding the public
corporation in order to ask how their concerns play out in the very different
world of nonprofit corporate governance. Such comparison and contrast
will clarify our thinking and help give us new ideas of what might work
best in this sector and why.
This essay discusses some, albeit not all, of the areas for which SOX has
received so much criticism. The first part of this essay discusses two sets of
criticisms of SOX. The first set of criticisms examines ways in which SOX
could be improved: loosening the required independence of the audit
committee, establishing special small firm rules for both certification of
financial statements and disclosure of internal controls, and eliminating the
prohibition of executive loans. The second set of criticisms attacks the
premise of SOX and its so-called federalization of corporate governance:
the inadequacy of federal judicial enforcement, the fear of federal
regulatory overreaching, and alternatives to federal regulation.
The second part of this essay argues that the critique of SOX, when
applied to the nonprofit world, in fact supports some expanded federal
presence regarding corporate governance. If the arguments of even the
most ardent opponents of federalization of corporate governance flounder
when considered in the context of the nonprofit sector, then the position of
those who favor federal regulation is vindicated and strengthened. The
essay makes several suggestions to that end, in particular suggesting federal
incentives for education of nonprofit boards and a form of "cooperative
federalism," in which federal law sets a floor for state regulatory programs.
I. THE CRITIQUE OF SOX
A. Reforming SOX
This section discusses three provisions of SOX that have had an impact
on the nonprofit sector and for which critics of SOX have suggested
revisions and improvements-an independent audit committee, executive
certifications, and executive loans. In each of these cases, the essay argues
that the criticism of SOX could and should affect practices in the nonprofit
sector.

30. See infra Part I.
31. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, From "Federalization" to "Mixed Governance" in
CorporateLaw: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 Buff. L. Rev. 721 (2005) (describing the
critique and rejecting it).
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1. Independent Audit Committee
Section 301 of SOX requires an audit committee consisting entirely of
32
independent directors to hire and oversee a firm's internal auditors.
Independence for the purpose of this requirement is defined as not receiving
compensation directly or indirectly from the corporation, except for board
service. 33 In addition, SOX requires the corporation to disclose whether it
has at least one financial expert serving on its audit committee and to
34
disclose why if it does not.

A variety of criticisms have been leveled against this provision.
Professors Henry N. Butler and Larry E. Ribstein question the practice of
placing confidence in independent board members. Why, they ask, would
someone who is not employed full-time have "adequate time, incentives,
and information" to conduct effective oversight? 35 Such general skepticism
about independent directors applies to independent audit committee
members as well.
In a leading critique of SOX, Professor Roberta Romano evaluated in
detail sixteen studies of the effect of audit committee composition on
corporate performance. 36
Several of the studies she discusses test
performance by such financial measures as return on assets and stock
37
market returns and thus are difficult to apply to nonprofit corporations.
However, she also describes eleven studies examining the impact of the
independence of the audit committee on the probability of financial
statement misconduct. 38
Two of these studies support auditor
independence, but Professor Romano questions their methodology. 39 The
other studies reach a different conclusion. She writes,
The compelling thrust of the literature on the composition of audit
committees, in short, does not support the proposition that requiring audit
committees to consist solely of independent directors will reduce the
probability of financial statement wrongdoing or otherwise improve
corporate performance. Not only is that the case for the overwhelming
majority of studies, but also, and more importantly,
that is so for the
40
studies using the more sophisticated techniques.
Significantly, Professor Romano finds that the studies show that
"[h]aving an independent director with financial expertise is, in fact, the
sole governance variable that is significantly correlated with the presence of

32. Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. IV 2004).
33. See id.

34. Id. § 407, 15 U.S.C. § 7265.
35. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 2, at 42.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Romano, supra note 25, at 1532.
See id.
See id.
See id.

40. Id. at 1533.
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an earnings restatement," 4 1 using such restatements as a proxy for
identifying corporate financial misconduct. She notes that national stock
exchange rules require audit committees to have at least one member with
accounting or financial expertise and considers it ironic that SOX mandates
full independence, but adopts its traditional disclosure approach regarding
42
expertise of audit committee members.
When it comes to audit committees, nonprofit applications of SOX begin
at a much more basic level-the need to have an audit at all. The possible
requirement of an audit raises particular concern by and for smaller
nonprofits. 43 The BoardSource/Independent Sector pamphlet advises that
"it is too onerous to demand that all nonprofit organizations undertake a full
audit," although it recommends an audit for charitable organizations with
$1 million or more in total annual revenues. 44 The Senate Finance White
Paper proposed an audit requirement for exempt organizations with more
than $250,000 in gross revenues; 45 the final report of the Panel on the
Nonprofit Sector recommended required audits for organizations with $1
million or more in total annual revenue. 4 6 California's Nonprofit Integrity
Act requires an audit for organizations with annual gross revenues
47
exceeding $2 million.
Nonprofit adaptations of SOX's audit committee requirements, however,
largely accept the independence mandate of SOX. Although California's
Nonprofit Integrity Act permits the audit committee membership to include
persons not on the board, the committee may not include "any members of
the staff (employees) of the corporation, whether or not they are unpaid
' '48
volunteers, including the president or CEO or the treasurer or CFO.
BoardSource/Independent Sector call for the committee to be composed of
"individuals who are not compensated for their service."'49 NACUBO
'50
directs that "[m]embers of the audit committee must be independent.
Many nonprofit invocations of SOX address the expertise of audit
committee members. California does not. It requires independence beyond
41. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance 25 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 3, 2004), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1005&context=-nyu/lewp.
42. Id. at 27-28.
43. Fremont-Smith, supra note 15, at 435.
44. BoardSource & Indep. Sector, supra note 7, at 3.

45. Staff of S. Fin. Comm., 108th Cong., Staff Discussion Draft 9 (2004) [hereinafter
White

Paper],

available

at

http://www.senate.gov/-finance/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204stfdis.pdf.
46. Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Strengthening Transparency, Governance, and
Accountability of Charitable Organizations: A Final Report to Congress and the
Nonprofit
Sector
35
(2005)
[hereinafter
Final
Report],
available at
http://info.ethicspoint.com/files/PDF/resources/PanelFinal-Report.pdf.

47. Cal. Gov't Code § 12586(e) (West 2004).
48. Office of the Cal. Att'y Gen., Charities-Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004,
http://ag.ca.gov/charities/faq.php#nonprofit (follow "FAQ 12: Who may serve on the audit
committee?" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).

49. BoardSource & Indep. Sector, supra note 7, at 4.
50. NACUBO Advisory Report, supra note 8, at 2.
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that of financial interest, but pays no attention to the, knowledge or
competence of such members. 5 1 Moreover, it permits the audit committee
to have a single member. 52 In contrast, the NACUBO Advisory directs that
there be at least one financial expert on the committee. 53
The
BoardSource/Independent Sector pamphlet urges that at least one member
of the audit committee meet the criteria for financial expertise as well as
54
that the committee as a whole have the requisite skills and experience.
For this issue, as well as the next two, we have the benefit of a recently
released study. The Urban Institute undertook a national survey of
nonprofit governance in 2005 as the first national, representative study of
nonprofit governance. 5 5 The study gathered responses from more than
5000 nonprofits of varied size, type, and location and presents preliminary
findings on the current extent of nonprofits' adherence to some major SOX
56
provisions, including the audit committee requirement.
The study found that, although not required, most nonprofits do have an
external audit-67% of the nonprofits in the study had such an audit in the
past two years. 57 Only 43% of the smallest nonprofits had an outside audit,
"but the figure jumps to 70 percent" if those that had their financial
statements compiled or reviewed by an. outside certified public accountant
are included. 5 8 The combined figure for organizations with expenditures
above $100,000 is 89% and 97% for organizations with expenses over $2
million.5 9 Of those organizations that did not have any outside review,
however, "62 percent said it would be somewhat or very difficult to comply
with a law requiring them to have one." 60 Nonetheless, the study suggests
that the requirement of some kind of outside review for all but the smallest
61
nonprofits may not be as much of a burden as feared.
At the same time, according to this study, a "separate audit committee
was the least commonly adopted practice related to Sarbanes-Oxley issues
in all size groups." 62 Only 15% of nonprofits with less than $100,000 in
annual expenses had an audit committee, while 58% of nonprofits with over

51.

Office of the Cal. Att'y Gen., supra note 48 (follow "FAQ 12: Who may serve on

the audit committee?" hyperlink).
52. Id. (follow "FAQ 14: What is the permissible size of the audit committee?"
hyperlink) ("The committee may have as few as one member.").
53. See NACUBO Advisory Report, supra note 8, at 9.
54. See BoardSource & Indep. Sector, supra note 7, at 4.
55. See Francie Ostrower & Maria J. Bobowick, Urban Institute, Nonprofit
Governance
and
the
Sarbanes-Oxley
Act
(2006),
available
at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311363-nonprofit-governance.pdf.

56. See generally id.
57. Id. at 3. "That figure jumps to 91 percent for nonprofits with expenses of over
$500,000, and over 96 percent among nonprofits with expenses greater than $2 million." Id.
58. Id.

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Note that the study used expenditures rather than revenue for its categories here. See
id. at 2 fig. 1, 3 fig.2, 5 fig.3.

62. Id. at 2.
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$40 million did have such a committee. 63 Most organizations with an audit
committee had created or revised the audit committee since 2002, leading
the study's authors to conclude that the "finding supports the idea that
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act spurred many nonprofits to reexamine
and revise their practices." 64 Smaller organizations in particular felt it
would be very difficult to comply with the requirement of an audit
committee and a slight majority of those without an audit committee
believed it would be somewhat or very difficult to satisfy a requirement to
have a financial expert serve on the audit committee. 6 5 The authors
conclude on this issue that "a law or best practice guideline calling for
nonprofits to establish a separate and independent audit committee would
have a widespread impact because most do not currently have such a
66
committee."
While the Urban Institute's survey suggests that attempts to establish a
separate and independent audit committee may meet resistance, Professor
Romano's work regarding audit committees suggests that any such effort
may be misplaced. According to her research, efforts should concentrate
67
not on independence of the full committee but on ensuring expertise.
When applied to the nonprofit sector, such research bears on the relative
benefit and burden as well, since ensuring a fully independent audit
committee can be difficult for small charities. The national survey of
nonprofits further supports this conclusion. 68 In addition, California's
acceptance of a single member audit committee, perhaps in response to this
difficulty, underscores some of the problems that the requirement of full
independence can create, since a single member audit committee without
required expertise seems unlikely to be able to exercise effective oversight
69
and monitoring.
2. Certification of Reports and Internal Controls
Section 404 of SOX requires a management report, attested to by an
external auditor, assessing the firm's internal controls. 70 Section 302
mandates that the chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer
certify the accuracy of the firm's periodic reports to the SEC. 7 1 Under

63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.

67. Romano, supra note 25, at 1532.

68. See Ostrower & Bobowick, supra note 55, at 5 (emphasizing "the importance of
acknowledging the potentially different impact, cost, and value of applying provisions to
nonprofits of different size").
69. Office of the Cal. Att'y Gen., supra note 48 (follow "FAQ 14: What is the
permissible minimum size of the audit committee?" hyperlink) (providing that it is
permissible to have a single member audit committee).
70. Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. IV 2004).
71. Id. § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241.
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section 302, signatories certify72that they have established, maintained, and
evaluated the internal controls.
Section 404, the internal controls rule, has been the subject of particular
criticism as enormously costly, especially for smaller companies.
According to Professors Butler and Ribstein, the SEC estimated the cost of
complying with the rule's requirements at "around .

.

.

$91,000 per

company,' not including 'additional cost burdens that a company will incur
as a result of having to obtain an auditor's attestation," but "Financial
Executives International estimated compliance costs at $4.36 million per
company as of mid-2005. ' 7 3 In response to such criticisms, the SEC
delayed reporting by small and foreign companies. 74 It also convened an
advisory committee on smaller public companies that has recommended
modified requirements for the smallest 1% and 5% of public companies by
capitalization. 7 5 In May 2007, the SEC revised the rules governing
reporting on internal controls under section 404.76 Under new interpretive
guidance, management can develop its own process in light of its own
assessment of risks. 77 The new rules will make compliance by smaller
public companies easier. Compliance, however, will not be further
78
delayed.
Prior to these changes, Professor Romano reviewed two available studies
regarding executive certification of financial reports. The first focused on
the "price effect for the small number of firms that did not make the
80
certification deadline." 79 It found that the requirement had no impact.
The second study examined the stock market reaction to certification by
bank holding companies on the theory that, because such financial
institutions are more opaque than nonfinancial firms, the certification or
lack thereof may be of particular significance to the market. 81 The second
study concluded that the certification requirement provides valuable
information to investors in such companies. 8 2 Professor Romano concludes
that further study is needed, but questions 83whether the certification
requirement will reduce accounting misconduct.
The response of the nonprofit sector to these kind of requirements
parallels that of the for-profit sector-acceptance, albeit perhaps skeptical,
of officer certification of financial reports. The Senate Finance Committee
72. Id.
73. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 2, at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. See id.
75. Id. at 91.
76. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Approves New Guidance for
Compliance
with
Section
404
of
Sarbanes-Oxley
(May
23,
2007),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-101.htm.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. Romano, supra note 41, at 96.
80. Id.

81. Id. at 98.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 101.
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White Paper, for example, included a proposal that the CEO or equivalent
officer of a tax exempt organization sign Form 990,84 a declaration similar
Panel
to that required under section 302 of SOX, and the final report of the
85
recommendation.
a
as
proposal
that
adopted
Sector
on the Nonprofit
The Urban Institute's national survey of nonprofit governance finds that
the CEOs of 51% of all nonprofits signed the Form 990, although the
number was only 29% for the smallest nonprofits. 86 However, of those
survey respondents whose CEO did not sign the form, only 13% responded
that "it would be somewhat or very difficult" for the CEO to sign a
declaration that the CEO "received reasonable assurance of the accuracy
and completeness of the IRS Form 990."87
Unlike its acceptance of officer certification, the nonprofit community
has objected strongly to the attestation of internal controls because of the
costly burdens, especially on smaller organizations. The most telling
reaction to this nonprofit extension of SOX is the saga of New York's
proposed legislation. As originally proposed, the New York legislation
would have required any nonprofit organization with revenues below
$250,000 to have its president and treasurer verify the accuracy of financial
information presented to their boards. 88 It also would have required
organizations with greater revenues or paid staff "to provide more extensive
certifications of the accuracy of the financial data, and the organization's
president and treasurer would have to certify that they reviewed the entity's
financial controls and that any problems had been reported to the audit
committee." 89 According to Professor Dana Brakman Reiser, "The New
York Proposals took the relevant provision almost directly from Sarbanes90
Oxley."
In
The nonprofit community reacted sharply to these provisions.
response, the legislative proposal was revised so that these provisions
would apply only to organizations having revenue in excess of $1 million or
assets in excess of $3 million. 9 1 In addition, the certifications could be
based on the "knowledge" of those certifying and could be made by paid
92
staff members.
These changes muted but did not eliminate the objections of the nonprofit
community. Although acknowledging that the revised thresholds exempted
some 60% of New York nonprofits that file Form 990, the Nonprofit
Coordinating Committee of New York expressed its main concern as being
"that the certifications will produce confusion and unease as to what they
84. White Paper, supra note 45, at 8.
85. Final Report, supra note 46, at 26.
86. Ostrower & Bobowick, supra note 55, at 3-4.

87. Id. at 4.
88. Fred Stokeld, Legislation to Apply Sarbanes-Oxley to New York Nonprofits Revised,
Tax Notes Today, Aug. 7, 2003, available at LEXIS, 2003 TNT 152-1.
89. Id.
90. Brakman Reiser, supra note 16, at 587.
91. See id. at 574 n.77.
92. Id. at 584 n.112.
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involve, and as to potential liability, and so will prompt nonprofits to hire
outside 'experts' to give them comfort as to the quality of their financial
controls." 93 As noted above, New York's former attorney general, Eliot
Spitzer, announced in September 2003 that further study of the draft
legislation, including this proposal, was needed. 94 However, the attorney
general's office apparently has abandoned efforts to introduce these
particular SOX reforms. "The AG's legislative agenda for nonprofit
reform, as announced in March 2005,
no longer includes accuracy or
' 95
reliability certification requirements."
The apprehensions expressed about the New York and other nonprofit
attestation proposals correspond to those made by the for-profit community.
Both sectors ask what additional protection such certification serves when
officers of the entity already had been required to sign federal and state
reports and, in so doing, attest to the verity of the information provided.
96
Both question whether this requirement will in any way deter wrongdoers.
Both sectors ask about the cost as compared to the benefit, since monies
expended on these efforts will be unavailable for the ultimate recipients of
the organization's revenues-the investors in the case of for-profits and
programs in the case of nonprofits. Both have particular concerns about the
smaller members of each sector. If, however, SOX is applied to nonprofits
only to require a signature and certification for signing the Form 990,
similar to that required for SEC reports by companies under section 302 of
SOX, without requiring any of the kind of the certifications required by
section 404 of SOX, it seems that there would not be significant burden or
opposition. At the same time, it seems equally uncertain how much benefit
97
such a requirement would generate.
3. Loans to Insiders
While not addressing executive compensation generally, SOX prohibits
loans to insiders. 98 This ban was introduced at the end of the SOX
legislative process in the Senate as a floor amendment to a provision that
would have required disclosure. 99 Critics argue that a prohibition is
overbroad because it calls into question traditional compensation practices,
such as advancing indemnification expenses, purchasing split-life insurance
policies, or permitting the cashless exercise of stock options. l0 0 Critics,
such as Romano, Butler, and Ribstein, find preferable the flexibility of state
93. Nonprofit Coordinating Comm. of N.Y., Sarbanes-Oxley for Nonprofits (Jan. 17,
2006), http://www.npccny.org/info/gti10.htm.

94. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
95. Brakman Reiser, supra note 16, at 571.
96. Id. at 583-84; Romano, supra note 25, at 1541.
97. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 16, at 585.
98. Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 §402, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (Supp. IV 2004).
99. See Romano, supra note 25, at 1538 (citing Sean A. Power, Sarbanes-Oxley Ends
Corporate Lending to Insiders: Some Interpretive Issues for Executive Compensation
Surrounding the Section 402 Loan Prohibition,71 UMKC L. Rev. 911, 924-35 (2003)).
100. See Romano, supra note 41, at 81 n.180.
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provisions, many of which impose either low substantive standards or
procedural rather than substantive constraints. 10
Professor Romano predicts that a prohibition on executive loans will
10 2
simply lead executives to negotiate for other forms of compensation.
She found few studies of executive loans, arguably because the practice was
widespread and uncontroversial, but she cites one study that found that
most loans were made for stock and stock option purchases with a much
smaller amount for relocation. 10 3 The study found that "executive loans in
many cases appear to serve their purpose of increasing managerial 4 stock
10
ownership, thereby aligning managers' and shareholders' interests."
The loan prohibition has had a relatively circumscribed impact on
nonprofit SOX applications. BoardSource/Independent Sector observes
that, "[b]ecause the practice of providing loans to nonprofit executives has
been a source of trouble in the past. .., it is strongly recommended that
nonprofit organizations not provide personal loans to directors or
executives." 10 5 The NACUBO Advisory, in contrast, specifies that, while
the audit committee should be aware of and review policies on personal
loans, "housing assistance included as part of compensation is not a
personal loan." 10 6 The California Nonprofit Integrity Act has a broader and
more general requirement-that the governing board of a nonprofit
organization reviews and approves the compensation of the executive
director and chief financial officer, upon initial employment and upon
renewal, extension, or modification, to ensure that the compensation is just
07
and reasonable.'1
The Pension Protection Act does include provisions prohibiting loans and
other forms of compensation to certain insiders of certain kinds of
nonprofits.' 0 8 All supporting organizations are prohibited from making any
grant, loan, or compensation to a substantial contributor, a member of the
substantial contributor's family, or an entity that is 35% or more controlled
by a contributor or related family member. 10 9 Similarly, donor-advised
funds are prohibited from making a grant, loan, compensation, or other
payment to donors, donor advisors, related parties of the foregoing, and

101. See supra Part I.A.1-2.
102. Romano, supra note 25, at 1538-39.
103. Id. at 1539 (citing Kathleen M. Kahle & Kaldeep Shastri, Executive Loans, 39 J. Fin.
& Quantitative Analysis 791 (2004)).
104. Id.
105. BoardSource & Indep. Sector, supra note 7, at 8.
106. NACUBO Advisory Report, supra note 8, at 8.
107. Cal. Gov't Code § 12586(g) (West 2004). Current California law does permit

nonprofit public benefit corporations to make loans to any officers or directors if approved
by the attorney general, to advance otherwise reimbursed expenses, to pay life insurance
premiums when repayment is secured by the policy, and to make a secured loan to finance
the principal residence of an officer. Cal. Corp. Code § 5236 (West 1981).
108. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified in
scattered sections of the I.R.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
109. See id.
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certain investment advisors. 1 10 These provisions, going to all types of
compensation, and not just loans, underscore Congress's particular concern
about supporting organizations and donor-advised funds and reflect
recommendations of the final report of the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector.
As the final report explained regarding donor-advised funds, "Since
intermediate sanctions rules often do not apply to a donor or advisor of a
donor-advised fund, Congress should enact new prohibitions targeted
specifically at the potential abuse of donor-advised funds by their donors or
1
advisors." 11
That nonprofit applications of SOX have not generally adopted the loan
prohibition is understandable. It is not an issue many nonprofits face. The
recent nonprofit survey determined that "[f]ewer than 3 percent [of
respondents] made loans to staff members, though the figure [rose] to
112
between 6 and 8 percent among the larger organizations."
The response of the nonprofit sector to this SOX provision seems also to
signal an agreement with the critics of SOX that this provision is
unnecessary and ineffective because state laws generally already have
provisions regarding loans to nonprofit insiders including, in some cases,
prohibitions. Moreover, even before enactment of the Pension Protection
Act, nonprofit loans to most insiders were regulated by federal tax law in
the form of the self-dealing rules applicable to private foundations and the
excess benefits rules applicable to public charities. 113 Finally, the primary
purpose of insider loans in the for-profit sector-to acquire stock-does not
apply to the nonprofit sector. The very essence of a nonprofit organization
is the inability of individuals, whether insiders or not, to obtain an equity
1 14
interest in the organization.
Criticism of the SOX prohibition on insider loans underscores two
important considerations that must inform any application of the
federalization critique of SOX to nonprofits, as discussed further below.
First, while critics of SOX often prefer no government regulation of
corporate governance to any regulation, they also prefer state regulation to
federal regulation, as noted at the beginning of this essay. 11 5 This state
preference rests in part on the traditional assignment of questions of
corporate governance to the states, with the result that states and their courts
have experience in addressing these issues. 116 It rests as well on a belief
110. See id.
111. Final Report, supra note 46, at 43. The prohibition applicable to all supporting
organizations and not just Type III supporting organizations has raised concerns from
Independent Sector and others. Such concerns are beyond the scope of this paper.
112. Ostrower & Bobowick, supra note 55, at 4.
113. I.R.C. §§ 4941, 4958 (2000).
114. See Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 Yale L.J. 835, 838
(1980).
115. See Ahdieh, supra note 31 and accompanying text; Romano, supra note 25, at 159799 (discussing "Returning Corporate Governance to the States"); see also Butler & Ribstein,
supra note 2, at 65-71.
116. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 2, at 65-66.
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that state law offers valuable flexibility because states compete when it
comes to regulation of corporate governance and that corporations choose
their state of incorporation on the basis of such competition, to the benefit
of corporate investors. 117
As discussed later in this essay, such
considerations play out very differently in the nonprofit sector.
Second, many SOX critics see the goal of regulating public companies as
helping to align the interests of managers with those of well-diversified
investors. 1 18 Thus, for example, these critics reject the traditional view that
separation of ownership and management in the public corporation results
in agency costs that require government regulation." 19 They argue instead
for a contractarian view-that the corporation is a product of private
contractual relationships that respond appropriately to market incentives
120
and monitoring.
This second set of beliefs does not apply to the nonprofit sector. We do
not enact laws regulating charities with a well-diversified donor in mind.
(In fact, we expect donors, especially foundations, to specialize.) The
separation is not between shareholders and managers in nonprofits but
between management and the recipients of the nonprofits' services and
products. We do not have an efficient nonprofit market filled with private
monitors. As Professor Henry Hansmann has written so influentially,
nonprofits demonstrate "a particular kind of 'market failure,' specifically
the inability to police producers by ordinary contractual devices," and this
"contract failure is the essential factor in the role of nonprofit enterprise."' 2 1
These differences between the nonprofit and the for-profit public
corporation should influence any nonprofit application of SOX as well as
the weight given to the more broad-based criticisms of SOX to which the
essay next turns. Tax exempt nonprofit charities must benefit public rather
than private interests. In short, nonprofit corporate governance is public
12 2
law in a way that for-profit governance is not.
B. Rejecting SOX
The critics of SOX would not be content even if the provisions of SOX
were revised. These critics' unhappiness with SOX goes far deeper. At the

117. See generally Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (1993).
118. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 2, at 4 ("[Ilt is well-accepted in the financial

economics literature that the costs and benefits of securities regulation should be evaluated
from the perspective of typical shareholders who can avoid some costs of fraud by investing
in diversified portfolios of shares.").
119. See generally Reinier Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A
Comparative and Functional Approach (2004).
120. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to CorporateFraud:
A Critiqueof the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. Corp. L. 1 (2002).

121. Hansmann, supra note 114, at 845.
122. For-profit governance has an important public dimension as well, as some scholars
emphasize. See generally Progressive Corporate Law (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995);
David A. Westbrook, Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility of a Capitalist

Reimagination,92 Geo. L.J. 61 (2003).
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very least, they believe, its provisions should be optional. 123 Even better,
they believe, would be repeal of SOX and removal of the federal
government from regulation of corporate governance because they object to
the federalization of corporate law. 124 This section of the essay discusses
three aspects of that objection-the fear of expanding federal regulatory
authority, the difficulties of federal judicial enforcement, and the
alternatives to federal regulation.
1. Expansive Claims of Federal Regulatory Authority
Critics of SOX's federalization of corporate governance are concerned
not only with the substance of the federal legislation, but also with the
possibility of overly expansive claims of authority by the federal agency
charged with carrying out the congressional mandate. 125 In particular, these
critics worry about attempts by the SEC to extend its dominion into
substantive corporate governance, fearing that SOX will encourage the
agency to do so.
Critics of SOX look to Business Roundtable v. SEC 126 for the proposition
that, even if federal securities law limits the ability of the SEC to directly
regulate corporate governance, the SEC will attempt to extend its dominion
into that arena. 12 7 The court in Business Roundtable reviewed an SEC rule
that would have barred national securities exchanges and national securities
associations from listing the stock of a corporation that had taken corporate
action that had the effect of reducing the per share voting rights of the
existing common shareholders. 12 8 The SEC had promulgated the rule
pursuant to its authority to amend on its own initiative the rules of
organizations, such as the New York Stock Exchange, in furtherance of the
purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.129
The court held, however, that "the SEC's assertion of authority directly
invades the 'firmly established' state jurisdiction over corporate governance
and shareholder voting rights."' 130 It quoted the Supreme Court in Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green that, "except where federal law expressly requires
certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law
will govern the internal affairs of the corporation."131 Business Roundtable
found the rule controlling the substantive allocation of powers among
classes of shareholders to exceed the SEC's authority. 132 Relying on this
precedent and the general nature of bureaucracies, the SOX critics fear that
123. See infra notes 125-55 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 125-55 and accompanying text.
125. See Ahdieh, supra note 31, at 729 (citing Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard,
BehavioralEconomics and the SEC, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 28-29 (2003)).

126. 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
127. See Ribstein, supra note 120, at 11 n.64; Romano, supra note 25, at 1523.
128. See Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 407-09.
129. See id.

130. Id. at 413.
131. Id. at 412 (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977)).
132. Id. at418-19.
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SOX will embolden the SEC to attempt to extend its authority further than
the explicit provisions of SOX itself.
Federal regulation of nonprofit governance by the IRS could confront
In United Cancer Council, Inc. v.
similar judicial limitations.
Commissioner,133 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
rejected the IRS's argument that an arm's length contract negotiated in
good faith between United Cancer Council (UCC) and its fund-raiser
rendered the fund-raiser an insider whose violation of the inurement
134
For our
prohibition required revocation of UCC's tax exemption.
purposes, what is of particular interest is the court's discussion of the
possible validity of the IRS's alternative ground for revoking exemption,
which the U.S. Tax Court had not reached and thus was not before the court
35
of appeals. 1
Under this alternative ground, the charity became ineligible for
exemption on the basis that, as a result of the contract's favorable terms, the
UCC was no longer being operated exclusively for charitable purposes but
rather for the private benefit of the fund-raiser. 136 The court stated,
[T]he board of a charity has a duty of care, just like the board of an
ordinary business corporation, and a violation of that duty which involved
the dissipation of the charity assets might (we need not decide whether it
would-we leave that issue to the Tax Court in the first instance) support
a finding that the charity was conferring a private benefit, even if the
influence over, the
contracting party did not control, or exercise undue
13 7
charity. This, for all we know, may be such a case.
Judge Richard Posner's language gives a sense of how carefully the IRS
will have to tread to make such arguments sound in the tax law rather than
in state law regarding nonprofit governance. The opinion suggests the
possibility, but no guarantee, of success.
The opinion also vividly illustrates how difficult it can be to decide
where to draw the dividing line between issues of corporate governance and
enforcement of tax law. Judge Posner allows that, even if the UCC had
hired a host of service suppliers rather than a single one, there could be no
possible inurement claim, "[b]ut there might still be a concern" that
"charitable enterprises that generate so little net contribution to their
charitable goals do not deserve the encouragement that a tax exemption
provides."' 138 He speculates that "maybe tax law has a role to play in
assuring the prudent management of charities," 139 but questions
empowering the IRS to yank a charity's tax exemption simply because the
Service thinks the charity's contract with its major fundraiser too one133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

165 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1999).
See id. at 1175-76.
See id. at 1179.
See id. at 1179-80.
Id. at 1180 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id. at 1178.
Id. at 1179.
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sided in favor of the fundraiser, even though the charity has not been
found to have violated any duty of faithful and careful 14management
that
0
the law of nonprofit corporations may have laid upon it.
Even Judge Posner finds uncertain what kind of causal connection between
failures of nonprofit governance and violation of tax rules must be
14 1
demonstrated to permit the IRS to act.
The IRS has begun to establish a relationship between good corporate
governance and eligibility for tax exemption. Conflicts of interest, the
thinking seems to go, encourage violations of the intermediate sanction
rules of the Internal Revenue Code's section 4958 and the self-dealing rules
of section 4941. Indeed, the conditions for establishing the section 4958
regulations' rebuttable presumption of reasonableness require that the
compensation arrangement or terms of transfer be approved only by
"individuals who do not have a conflict of interest ... with respect to the
42
[transaction]." 1
Establishing a conflict of interest policy, however, is a matter of internal
corporate governance and not traditional tax law. 143 To encourage this
practice without exceeding its authority, the IRS has drafted the Form 1023,
the Application for Recognition of Exemption, to include a question under
the section of the form devoted to compensation and other financial
arrangements asking whether the organization has adopted a conflict of
interest policy. 14 4 If so, the form requests a copy of the policy and an
explanation of how it was adopted. The instructions to the form also
include a sample conflict of interest policy. 14 5 The form, however, is
careful to note, "A conflict of interest policy is recommended though it is
not required to obtain exemption." 146 To require adoption of a conflict of
interest policy might risk the IRS exceeding its authority.
The IRS has continued to address issues of corporate governance. In
February 2007, it released a discussion draft of preliminary guidelines
designed to encourage good governance practices.1 47 The draft guidelines
make a valiant attempt to tie these guidelines to the IRS role in regulating
tax exempt entities:
"While adopting a particular practice is not a
requirement for exemption, [we believe that] an organization that adopts
some or all of these practices is more likely to be successful in pursuing its
140. Id.
141. See id.

142. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a)(1) (2006).
143. The Urban Institute finds that overall 50% of nonprofits in the survey had a conflict
of interest policy, but that only 23% of the smallest had one, while 95% of the largest did.
Moreover, of those that had a conflict of interest policy, 47% had created or revised it since
2002. Ostrower & Bobowick, supra note 55, at 4.
144. See I.R.S. Form 1023, Application for Recognition of Exemption (OMB No. 15450056) (2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fl 023.pdf.

145. See I.R.S. Instructions for Form 1023 (Cat. No. 17132z) (2006), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1023.pdf.

146. I.R.S. Form 1023, supra note 144, at 4.
147. See IRS, Draft Good Governance Practices for 501(c)(3) Organizations, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/good-governance-practices.pdf.
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exempt purposes and earning public support."' 148 The draft guidelines call
for a mission statement; a code of ethics and whistle-blower policies;
exercise of due diligence consistent with a duty of care; exercise of the duty
of loyalty that avoids conflicts of interests; transparency about the
organization's mission, activities, and finances; adoption of fund-raising
policies; use of obtaining financial audits or other financial review;
payment of only reasonable compensation; and a written policy regarding
49
document retention. 1
A June 2007 discussion draft of a revised Form 990-the annual
information report required of most tax exempt entities-substitutes
detailed required disclosure for suggested guidelines. 150 An addition to the
form asks a number of questions with subparts on governance,
management, and financial reporting.' 5 1 The new section asks, for
example, the number of members of the governing body and number of
independent directors.1 52 It asks not only whether the organization has a
conflict of interest policy, but also how many transactions the organization
reviewed under the policy during the year. 153 It requires answers to
questions about a written whistle-blower policy, written document retention
and destruction policy, contemporaneous documentation of meetings,
whether the organization has an audit committee, whether the
organization's governing body reviewed the Form 990 before filing, and
which documents are made available to the public. 154 In commenting on
the draft form, Suzanne Ross McDowell, a well-known exempt
organization practitioner, observed, "It is relevant to both ask whether the
IRS should be incentivizing behavior which is not required by the Internal
Revenue Code and for which there is no direct connection to requirements
15 5
of the Internal Revenue Code."
The Senate Finance Committee's White Paper had offered a number of
56
suggestions for federal action to encourage strong board governance.'
These included not only expansion of the self-dealing rules now applicable
to private foundations to all public charities, but also requirements that the
charity establish a conflict of interest policy and that it have at least three
and no more than fifteen members as well as a minimum number or
percentage of independent board members.1 57 The final report of the Panel
on the Nonprofit Sector in some cases strengthened the recommendations.
148. Id. at 1.
149. See generally id.
150. See I.R.S. Draft Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (OMB
No. 1545-0047) (2007), availableat http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/form990coreform.pdf

151. See id. at 4.
152. See id.
153. Seeid.
154. See id.
155. Christopher Quay & Fred Stokeld, IRS's Lerner Details Discussion Draft of
Redesigned Form 990, Tax Notes Today, June 15, 2007, available at LEXIS, 2007 TNT
116-4 (internal quotation marks omitted).

156. See Senate FinanceIssues Discussion Draft on Reforms for EOs, supra note 21.
157. See id.
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For example, the final report recommended that at least one-third of the
board of a public charity be independent. 158 The Pension Protection Act of
2006, however, did not give the IRS authority to impose any of these
requirements.' 59 Nonetheless, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max
Baucus and ranking minority member Senator Chuck Grassley praised the
discussion draft of the revised Form 990160 for facilitating an increase in
exempt organization transparency. If Congress wishes the IRS to have
some authority over corporate governance of exempt organizations,
however, it should give the agency explicit congressional authority to do so
to avoid the kind of questions Judge Posner asked in United Cancer
Council.
2. Judicial Enforcement
Critics of SOX question the ability of federal courts to adjudicate issues
of corporate governance.
Professors Butler and Ribstein quote the
observations of two prominent Delaware judges:
In our experience, the effective adjudication of corporate law disputes
requires a great deal of direct involvement by the trial judge. The factual
records in such cases are often large and make for demanding reading.
Moreover, many of these matters are time-sensitive and involve the
application of complex legal doctrines to the evidence in a very short
timeframe-a reality that limits the capacity of judges to delegate very
much of the work to law clerks.
As we understand it, the federal courts already face a stiff challenge in
addressing their already formidable caseloads.... In view of that reality,
it seems unlikely that the federal courts are well-positioned to absorb the
burden of adjudicating
corporate governance disputes now handled by
61
state courts.'
Such disputes regarding corporate governance require courts to exercise
equity jurisdiction. In 1975, Alvin D. Lurie, an assistant commissioner of
the IRS, announced in a speech that the "ability to invoke the jurisdiction of
an equity court, with its broad and adaptable powers, is uniquely the
province of the states."' 162 In 1977, however, the Treasury sought but did

158. Final Report, supra note 46, at 7.
159. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified in
scattered sections of the I.R.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
160. See Senate Finance Issues Discussion Draft on Reforms for EOs, supra note 21.
161. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 2, at 34 (quoting William B. Chandler III & Leo E.
Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System:
PreliminaryReflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 953, 984

n.85 (2003) (citations omitted)).
162. Silber, supra note 29, at 626 (citing Nina Crimm, Why All Is Not Quiet on the
"Home Front"for CharitableOrganizations,29 N.M. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1999) (citing Alvin D.
Lurie, Assistant Comm'r of the IRS for Employee Plans and Exempt Orgs., Speech Before
the Third Annual Conference of the National Association of Attorneys General Special
Committee on Charitable Trusts and Solicitations (Apr. 1975), reprinted in New
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not receive authority for the IRS to seek remedial decrees in equity in
federal district courts to correct violations uncovered while enforcing its
63
authority to assess excise taxes on private foundations. 1
The Senate Finance Committee's White Paper proposed expanding the
powers of the U.S. Tax Court to enable it to enforce the fiduciary duties of
boards and take action against both the charitable organizations themselves
and individual board members as well as to permit individual directors and
members of the public to sue charitable organizations and their directors in
Tax Court for alleged violations of fiduciary obligations. 164 The Panel on

the Nonprofit Sector addressed "Federal Court Equity Powers and Standing
to Sue" in the supplemental report to its final report. 165 The panel wrote,
"Congress should not expand the equity powers or jurisdiction of the Tax
Court over charitable fiduciaries." 166 The supplemental report explained,
Current state law and common law principles provide sufficient remedies
for breaches of fiduciary duties. Redress for such breaches should remain
the province of the state courts, since state judges and attorneys general
have the greatest expertise in disputes involving corporate and trust
governance and fiduciary responsibilities. The Tax Court and the IRS,
whose expertise lies in the application of the tax law, are not as well16 7
suited to take on these cases.

The Tax Court has been granted equity jurisdiction in recent years in
cases involving innocent spouses and collection due process. 168 Consistent
with the observations of the supplemental report, the Tax Court's exercise
of this equity jurisdiction has raised serious questions, not only as to its
69
efficacy but even as to its constitutionality. 1

Developments in Tax-Exempt Institutions, Lurie Calls for Cooperation with States in
Regulating CharitableOrganizations,43 J. Tax'n 58, 58 (Kenneth H. Liles ed., 1975))).
163. See Evelyn Brody, A Taxing Time for the Bishop Estate: What Is the I.R.S. Role in
Charity Governance?, 21 U. Haw. L. Rev. 537, 567-70 (1999).
164. See White Paper, supra note 45, at 16.
165. Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Strengthening Transparency, Governance, and
Accountability of Charitable Organizations: A Supplement to the Final Report to Congress
and the Nonprofit Sector 28 (2006) [hereinafter Supplemental Report], available at
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/supplement/Panel-SupplementFinal.pdf.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 29. The supplemental report further provides,
Given the unfettered standing of state attorneys general to pursue suits for breach
of fiduciary duty, the limited groups of others with standing to sue, and the right of
any person to bring a complaint to the IRS or state charity official, no constructive
purpose would be served by expanding the number of persons with standing to sue
charities in the federal Tax Court.
Id.
168. See I.R.C. §§ 6015, 6320, 6330 (2000).
169. See generally Leslie Book, The Collection Due Process Rights: A Misstep or a Step
in the Right Direction?, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 1145 (2005); Diane L. Fahey, The Tax Court's
Jurisdictionover Due Process Collection Appeals: Is It Constitutional?, 55 Baylor L. Rev.
453 (2003); Leandra Lederman, Equity and the Article I Court: Is the Tax Court's Exercise
of Equitable Powers Constitutional?,5 Fla. Tax Rev. 357 (2001).
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On the other hand, review of excise taxes has long been part of the
workload of the Tax Court. To the extent that the Tax Court considers selfdealing under the private foundation rules or excess benefits under the
intermediate sanctions rules, it already is addressing issues of fiduciary
duty, albeit indirectly, since these rules implicate the duties of care, loyalty,
and obedience. 170 The discussion of the possible relation between the
private benefit doctrine and the prudent management of charities, discussed
above in the context of United Cancer Council, shows how the Tax Court
already must grapple with such issues.
Moreover, the argument in favor of state court adjudication of nonprofit
governance disputes is not as unalloyed as the Panel's supplemental report
would have it.171 While state attorneys general have the authority to sue to

enforce fiduciary duties, the authority in many states is seldom exercised.
As Professor Harvey P. Dale has quipped in his inimitable way, "In most
states, the Charity Bureau of the Attorney General's Office is inactive,
172
ineffective, understaffed, overwhelmed, or some combination of these."'
Professor Norman Silber quotes the president of the National Association of
Charities Officials as lamenting, "Of our fifty states ...

most do not have

personnel dedicated to the exclusive regulation of charities."' 173 Since, as
discussed below, individuals seldom have standing to enforce violations of
nonprofit governance laws, without enforcement of such disputes by
attorneys general, state courts do not gain experience in questions of
nonprofit governance, questions, as also discussed below, that are quite
different from those involving for-profit corporations.
Professor Marion Fremont-Smith points to New York, California,
Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Ohio as states with well-staffed and
active charity bureaus. 174 Professor Silber adds Pennsylvania and Missouri
as states with large populations and active charity enforcement in which
attorneys general at least have the legal authority to bring a large variety of
legal actions for nonprofit misconduct. 175 He continues, "These are areas
where national nonprofit organizations-and those intending to become
national-need to operate. By so doing, they open themselves to effective
176
monitoring by multiple state jurisdictions."
Professor Silber's argument requires consideration of the extent to which
a state can regulate the internal corporate governance of a nonprofit
operating in its state but incorporated in another. That question is the
subject of other papers in this conference and beyond the scope of this
essay. 17 7 But it also involves the issue of state competition so dear to the
170. I.R.C. §§ 4941, 4958 (2000).
171. See Supplemental Report, supra note 165.
172. Fremont-Smith, supra note 15, at 443 (internal quotation marks omitted).

173. Silber, supra note 29, at 622 (citation omitted).
174. Fremont-Smith, supra note 15, at 445.
175. See Silber, supra note 29, at 622.
176. Id.

177. I note, however, that FAQ 1 regarding the California Nonprofit Integrity Act states,
"The law applies to all foreign charitable corporations (corporations formed under the laws
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hearts of many of the critics of SOX. Professor Romano has written that
states "operate in a competitive environment: Corporations choose in
which state to incorporate and can change their domicile if they are
dissatisfied with a legal regime . .. .,178
Although I do not know of any studies addressing the question, it is my
impression that such state competition has not operated strongly, if at all, in
the nonprofit sector, although practitioner friends have reported that this
may be changing. Even if that is the case, far more important than state
competition for nonprofits is the competition between the corporate form
and the trust form and the extent to which choosing the trust form can avoid
certain nonprofit corporation requirements.1 79 Nonetheless, I do not believe
that any single state dominates the incorporation of nonprofit corporations
80
in the way that Delaware dominates incorporation of public companies.1
If such competition existed, we would expect nonprofit corporations to
choose states with little statutory constraints and little state enforcement.
Again, that does not seem to be the case. My own home state of
California has some famously onerous requirements, most notably a
requirement that no more than 49% of the board of nonprofit public benefit
corporations, including family foundations and the smallest of public
charities, can be interested parties, 18 1 and a very stringent application of the
charitable trust doctrine. 182 Nonetheless, according to 2000 Core File of the
National Center for Charitable Statistics, California had 87,775 active
section 501(c)(3) organizations organized in the state circa 1999,183 while
New York had 57,574,184 and Delaware, the darling of the public
corporation, had only 2502.185
of other states) doing business or holding property in California for charitable purposes."
Office of the Cal. Att'y Gen., supra note 48 (follow "FAQ 1: To whom does the Nonprofit
Integrity Act of 2004 apply?" hyperlink).

178. Romano, supra note 25, at 1598. See generally Romano, supra note 41.
179. See generally Evelyn Brody, Charity Governance: What's Trust Law Got to Do
With It?, 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 641 (2005).
180. Clark, supra note 25, at 257 (stating that half of all public companies are Delaware
corporations).
181. Cal. Corp. Code § 5227 (West 1990). "Interested" is defined as having received
compensation for services rendered within the previous twelve months, including as an
independent contractor or otherwise (except to a director as director) and certain family
members of such persons. Id. California practitioners often form charities as trusts rather
than corporations in part for this reason. Many prominent California nonprofits, including
the J. Paul Getty Trust and Stanford University, are trusts.
182. See Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36, 40-41 (Ct. App. 1977).

183. Nat'l Ctr. for Charitable Statistics, Active 501(c)(3) Charitable Organizations in
California, Circa 1999 (2001), available at http://nccs2.urban.org/stcover/1999/99_CAc3.pdf.

These data exclude foreign corporations.
184. Nat'l Ctr. for Charitable Statistics, Active 501(c)(3) Charitable Organizations in New
York, Circa 1999 (2001), available at http://nccs2.urban.org/stcover/1999/99

NYc3.pdf.

185. Nat'l Ctr. for Charitable Statistics, Active 501(c)(3) Charitable Organizations in
Delaware, Circa 1999 (2001), available at http://nccs2.urban.org/stcover/l999/99 DEc3.pdf.
Delaware does not have a separate statutory scheme for nonprofits. Its General Corporation
Law is applicable to business corporations and nonprofit corporations. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8,
§§ 201-398 (2001).
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My impression is that nonprofit corporations are far more likely to
incorporate in the state of their initial or primary operations.1 86 Thus, to the
extent the critique of SOX for federalization of corporate governance,
including the critique of federal judicial enforcement, turns on a
competitive market regarding a corporation's choice of governance regime
to which it will subject itself, the argument does not apply to federal
regulation of nonprofits.
Nonetheless, the appropriate locus of judicial enforcement for questions
of nonprofit corporate governance is far from certain. On the one hand,
expanding the equity jurisdiction of federal courts is problematic. On the
other hand, the argument for state court enforcement is not strong. While
state statutory laws may adequately address the issue, lack of enforcement
of the provisions in many states means that courts have little experience in
such matters. Thus, there is the risk that they would rely on experience
with for-profit corporations, even though "the corporate law that has been
developed for business corporations, and particularly that which concerns
the fiduciary obligations of corporate management, often provides a poor
187
model for nonprofit corporation law."
To some extent, the question is an empirical one. If Professor Silber is
correct and the vast majority of charitable dollars and organizations are
subject to the regulations of states that have both active enforcement and
jurisdiction over fiduciary duties of public charities, 188 the argument for
some kind of federal regulation may weaken.
The holes in state
enforcement, however, suggest to me that the argument for federal
regulation and enforcement is stronger for nonprofit corporations than for
for-profit ones. It may be preferable, however, as Professor Evelyn Brody
has suggested, to follow the 1977 proposals and give federal equity
jurisdiction to the federal district courts rather than the Tax Court with its
specialized docket and the experience of its judges. 189
3. Alternatives to Federal Regulation
Critics of SOX argue that its mandatory federal regulation was
unnecessary because other options would have better corrected the ills it

186. As noted above, this tendency may be changing. Material is now available that
allows lawyers to compare the applicable law of various jurisdictions to decide where to

incorporate. For example, CCH, a provider of tax software, has an interactive Smart Chart
available on its Tax Research Network in which the position of various jurisdictions on
selected topics can be compared. See CCH, Salestax.com from CCH Is New Destination Site
for Sales, Use Tax Professionals, http://www.cch.com/press/news/2005/20050125t.asp (last
visited Oct. 12, 2007).
187. Hansmann, supra note 114, at 845; see also Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary
Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and ProposedReforms,
23 J. Corp. L. 631, 632 (1998).

188. See Silber, supra note 29, at 636.
189. Evelyn Brody, Law Professor Presents White Paper on Charity Oversight, Tax

Notes Today, July 15, 2004, availableat LEXIS, 2004 TNT 143-92.
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addressed. 190 If Congress had not acted, the argument goes, others would
have.
One alternative, of course, is state corporate law, as discussed above.
State law gives shareholders various rights to sue their corporations through
derivative actions. 19 1 Such shareholders have standing to do so. Either
large, highly visible institutional investors (themselves often nonprofits,
such as retirement funds) or smaller shareholders in class actions will have
sufficient financial motivation to bring such suits. Institutional investors
often have large enough stakes to influence management directly.
Critics of SOX point as well to the fact that stock exchanges subject their
listed companies to governance provisions. Professor Romano observes
that stock exchange audit committees that were in place pre-SOX required
financial literacy of all audit members and accounting or finance expertise
of one. 192 She notes, "A stock exchange is a more appropriate locus of
authority for such requirements as it is capable of moving far more rapidly
than Congress, should the business environment change and necessitate
adjustment in the expertise requirement."'1 93 Professors Butler and Ribstein
observe that the New York Stock Exchange has adopted listing standards
194
requiring the majority of the board to be independent.
Perhaps most importantly in the mind of these critics is that securities
analysts and investment managers can take advantage of the long-standing
mandatory disclosure system to monitor public corporations. "The question
for federal regulators and Congress should have been whether this system
195
ought to have been tweaked to give the market the information it needs"
because "[t]he only effective antidotes to fraud are active and vigilant
markets and professionals with strong incentives to investigate corporate
196
managers and dig up corporate information."
As many others have suggested, none of these methods is available for
nonprofits. Professor Brakman Reiser writes, "[T]he nonprofit sector lacks
comparable private groups motivated and authorized to act on disclosed
information."' 19 7
Professor Fremont-Smith explains that nonprofit
corporations are not subject either to "'watchdog' shareholders with an
equity incentive to police the action of board members" or to "an active
plaintiffs bar that would profit from bringing derivative suits." 198 While

190. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 2, at 94-99.
191. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
192. See Romano, supra note 41, at 40 n.82.

193. Id. at 40 n.82.
194. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 2, at 36. Included among the requirements are that a
majority of the board cannot have a material relationship with the firm; directors must meet
without management; and both the nominating and compensation committee must be wholly
independent. Id. at 111 n.29.
195. Id. at29.
196. Ribstein, supra note 120, at 3.
197. Brakman Reiser, supra note 16, at 602.
198. Fremont-Smith, supra note 15, at 233-34; see also Brakman Reiser, supra note 16,
at 602.
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large grant makers and large donors can exercise some control over
organizations to which they make grants, should some donor or would-be
beneficiary of a nonprofit corporation wish to bring suit in state court to
enforce duties related to corporate governance, they will generally lack
standing. 199 Proposals to expand such standing at the
state level are among
20 0
the most controversial of possible nonprofit reforms.
Private groups, such as the Better Business Bureau's Wise Giving
Alliance program, do attempt to function as watchdogs of the nonprofit
sector. 20 1 The requirement that exempt organizations make the Form 990s
widely available and the easy access to such forms on Guidestar, which
posts information on all tax-exempt organizations, have increased
disclosure. But without a group of sophisticated analysts with the motive to
examine the data available, the disclosure model that underlies our
20 2
securities laws can have only limited relevance to the nonprofit sector.
Overall, the response of the nonprofit sector to SOX can be viewed either as
a vindication or a repudiation of SOX's critics. The issues of corporate
governance that the federal mandate of SOX attempted to address clearly
struck a chord within the nonprofit sector and its regulators. The response,
however, was exactly the kind that SOX's critics cheer-advice from
advisors, professional groups, and trade organizations urging voluntary
adoption of SOX principles and legislative proposals largely from the
states, with only California actually adopting additional regulation. 20 3 Until
very recently, Congress did not act, and the action it took was limited. For
the most part, the action was by private parties on a voluntary basis. What
more could free marketers desire?
Yet the nonprofit sector responded to the federal legislation of SOX as
well as to the threat of far-reaching legislation as described in the Senate
White Paper. Without such federal impetus, it is not clear what would have
happened regarding improved nonprofit governance. Moreover, the sector
itself is open to federal legislation beyond that enacted in the Pension
Protection Act. For example, the final report of the Panel on the Nonprofit
Sector, which involved and has been endorsed by many kinds of nonprofit
organizations throughout the country, urges Congress to direct the IRS "to
require that the Form 990 series returns be signed, under penalties of
perjury, by the chief executive officer, the chief financial officer, or the
highest ranking officer of the organization" and to require charities with at
least $1 million in total annual revenues to conduct an audit. 20 4

199. Fremont-Smith, supra note 15, at 324-26.
200. Id. at 336-38.
201. See BBB Wise Giving Alliance, http://www.give.org/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2007);
see also Charity Navigator, http://www.charitynavigator.org/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2007);
American Institute of Philanthropy, http://www.charitywatch.org/toprated.html (last visited
Sept. 12, 2007).
202. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 16, at 612; Brakman Reiser, supra note 6, at 24345.
203. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.

204. Final Report, supra note 46, at 86.
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That the nonprofit sector itself welcomes at least some federal regulation
does not of itself undermine the arguments made by the critics of SOX;
nonetheless, the arguments they make to question federal regulation of
public companies apply with far less force to nonprofit corporations. I turn
to the implications of this conclusion next.

II. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NONPROFIT SECTOR
As Professor Fremont-Smith has said, "A distinguishing feature of
charity regulation is that it is a dual system, with state and federal rules and
enforcement programs that parallel each other to a large degree." 20 5 The
challenge is how best to harmonize and make use of this dual system.
One school of thought fears that, in the nonprofit sector as elsewhere,
"inadequate attention to poor performance results from coextensive
supervision and enforcement responsibility" because "the more complex,
multilayered, or fragmented the legal and political setting," the more likely
it is that the result will be unsatisfactory regulation, the tragedy of the
"regulatory commons." 20 6 Professor Silber suggests making "more formal
assignments of primary enforcement responsibilities in the nonprofit legal
'20 7
regime" in order to "increase the predictability of enforcement.
Another school welcomes "jurisdictional redundancy" and duplication,
particularly in judicial review. Thus, Professor Robert Ahdieh defends
SOX against its critics by suggesting that mixed governance fosters
"efficient innovation in corporate law." 20 8 The Pension Protection Act of
2006 appears to endorse such a point of view. It permits the IRS to disclose
to state officials charged with overseeing tax exempt organizations
information about investigations related to refusal to recognize an
organization as tax exempt or revocation of tax exemption. 209 Such a
change to the law, proponents have argued, will enable states to identify
"organizations that have violated state law." 2 10
For the nonprofit sector, much of the concern about this dual system is
aimed at spotty state regulation. Thus, the final report of the Nonprofit
Panel recommends that Congress "authorize funding to be provided to all
states to establish or increase oversight and education of charitable
organizations," as well as additional matching dollars for further
2
improvements. 11

205. Fremont-Smith, supra note 15, at 428.
206. Silber, supra note 29, at 633-34 (quoting William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the
Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 22 (2003)).
207. Silber, supra note 29, at 638-39.
208. Ahdieh, supra note 31, at 756.
209. See Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 1224, I.R.C. § 6104 (West 2007).
210. Silber, supra note 29, at 630 (quoting William Josephson, Comments on Taxpayer
2003),
(Mar.
26,
Proposal
Rights
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=306).
211. Final Report, supra note 46, at 24.
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To me, the reasoning underlying the critiques of SOX set out above
justifies both regulation of nonprofits and a greater federal role in nonprofit
governance. Given the lack of private parties monitoring the sector and the
limited state enforcement, we need to develop ways to achieve a more
direct federal presence regarding matters of governance.
First, I suggest federalization of incentives for education. Everyone who
has looked at the issue of nonprofit governance has stressed the importance
of educating nonprofit boards. 2 12 The work of Professor Romano, one of
the foremost critics of SOX, confirms the importance of financial expertise
for audit committee members. The current incentives for such financial and
general board education in the nonprofit sector, however, have simply not
been adequate. We need to come up with ways in which the IRS can
encourage nonprofit corporations to educate their boards.
One possibility is allowing the completion of educational programs
developed by the IRS or the demonstration of expertise on the board to
expedite or reduce fees for processing exemption applications. Another
possibility would be demonstration of some kind of educational programs
or the presence of expert board members as one of the conditions for the
rebuttable presumptions under section 4958. Financial issues go well
beyond insider compensation, of course, but since compensation represents
so large a percentage of so many nonprofit organizations' costs, the
connection is at least plausible. A showing of educational programs might
go to rebate or correction of various excise taxes. As with the initial
application, educational programs developed by the IRS might be offered as
part of any periodic required renewal of tax exempt status, with different
programs for organizations of different sizes, complexity, and
sophistication. As with the initial application, completion of the programs
or demonstration of board expertise could make the organization eligible for
a reduced fee for such renewal.
Second, and more fundamentally, I urge consideration of legislation
establishing some federal minimum standards of nonprofit governance for
the IRS to enforce, with the IRS to withdraw if state regulation is shown to
be sufficient. 2 13 The arrangement I envision would, to some extent, parallel
current federal-state enforcement of environmental laws.
As one
environmental textbook explains,

212. See id. at 24-27; Brakman Reiser, supra note 16, at 612.
213. Cf Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Foundations and Governments: State and Federal Law
and Supervision 438-40 (1965) ("It is, however, worthwhile to consider whether state
programs of supervision can be utilized to complement federal programs .... Furthermore, the
Commissioner should be granted discretion to withhold action if the state has taken jurisdiction
and is effecting a correction."); Fremont-Smith, supra note 15, at 461; John G. Simon, Private

Foundations as a Federally Regulated Industry: Time for a Fresh Look? (1999) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Nat'l Ctr. on Philanthropy and the Law),
available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/ncpl/library/publications/Confl999-SimonFinal.pdf
(suggesting that the federal government take steps to help state attorneys general do their jobs

more efficiently through revenue sharing to deliver needed resources to state regulators, with
the primary role to be given to the states).
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The environmental laws authorize EPA to delegate to states responsibility
for administering and enforcing the federal clean water, clear air, and
hazardous waste programs. To qualify for program delegation, states
must satisfy EPA that they can operate the programs in a manner that
meets all federal requirements .... If states operating delegated federal
programs fail to meet minimum federal standards, EPA has the authority
to withdraw the delegation, but this authority is virtually never exercised
because the Agency is loathe to take over operation of state programs
without receiving additional resources. The EPA also has generally had
the authority to take enforcement action on its own when it2 14does not
believe that states have adequately addressed certain violations.
This relationship, known in the environmental context as well as others
as cooperative federalism, seems to me to offer a model. I imagine an
approach for the nonprofit sector that would explicitly allow states to
establish requirements more rigorous than the minimal federal ones. Such
is the case for environmental law, where "cooperative federalism involves
programs where federal monies are made available to each state contingent
on its creation of a regulatory scheme that is at least as stringent as the
2 15
federal floor."
Such a proposal, of course, needs more detail as to what such minimum
standards and sufficient state enforcement would be. Building substantive
requirements related to the governance disclosures required by the new
draft Form 990 is one possibility. Such a proposal is not without dangers,
some of which, such as federal judicial enforcement, I have sketched out
above. It would complicate the role of the IRS and divert it from its tax
functions in some states and not others. Sufficient funding, as always,
would be an issue. However, I agree with Professor Fremont-Smith that the
intermediate sanction regime has already established "a major expansion of
the power of the Service to regulate the behavior of charitable
fiduciaries" 2 16 and that "it is naive to think that Congress would remove
217
regulation of charities or other exempt entities from the Service."
This approach of imposing minimal federal standards that a state could
displace avoids some of the objections that have been made to
federalization in this area. Unlike full-fledged federalization, it would
avoid a general need for a nonprofit to satisfy conflicting federal and state
duties. It would answer Professor Brody's concern regarding the proposal
in the White Paper to impose federal standards "that are more stringent than

214. Robert V. Percival et al., Environment Regulation: Law, Science, and Policy 95354 (5th ed. 2006).
215. Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and National Resources Law, 14
N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 179, 189 (2005); see also Robert D. Comer, Cooperative Conservation:
The Federalism Underpinnings to Public Involvement in the Management of Public Lands,
75 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1133 (2004); Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative
Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1692 (2001).
216. Fremont-Smith, supra note 15, at 263.
217. Id. at 465.
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allowed under State law." 2 18 It would allow those states that have active
charities bureaus to continue their work and supply needed enforcement in
those states that do not.
CONCLUSION

Nonprofit corporations, of course, are not alone in having to satisfy both
federal and state regulators. The history of regulation in this sector,
combining state corporate law with federal tax law, has produced some
particular complications. How best to resolve those complications is a
continuing challenge, but one that cannot be avoided.
The response to SOX and the relationship between the SEC and for-profit
corporate governance offer some guidance and insight. The critique of
SOX suggests revisions to current laws or proposed laws regarding
nonprofits. In particular, it suggests reliance on expertise instead of
complete independence for audit committees.
It also, however,
demonstrates that the nonprofit sector differs from the for-profit sector in
ways that favor further federal regulation of the nonprofit sector.

218. Brody, supra note 189.

